Interesting Perspective on Iraq

Of course I am a little biased, seeing as it was written by my favorite former professor. =)

By Dr. Robert Stacey

I never have understood how tea leaves are supposed to predict the future. How does one glean concrete information from a soggy wad of brown leaves? At first glance, recent events in Iraq may seem about as orderly as a lump of wet leaves, but careful scrutiny reveals a picture more sensible than that of a fortuneteller's.
The most important indicator of Iraq's future is the series of talks between Iranian and American officials, the third round of which took place last week. On their face, such talks seem highly improbable. Iran and the U.S. have taken twisted pleasure in hating one another these past 30 years. And yet here is the senior partner in the Axis of Evil sitting down to have a cordial discussion with the Great Satan. How did that happen?
Since the start of the insurgency in Iraq, Iran has assumed the Americans would eventually "cut and run." When that happened, the Iranians assumed they would exert their influence over the Shiite majority in Iraq and turn their neighbor into a client state that could be used to extend hegemony throughout the rest of the Middle East.
The only problem with this plan was that the U.S. did not bow out as predicted. Earlier this year when George Bush - having suffered a stinging electoral defeat and facing a massive public backlash - announced not a withdrawal but a surge, Iran began to recalculate. Perhaps the Americans were not leaving after all.
The Iranians remember the last time they waited out a weakened, lame-duck president in Jimmy Carter. They ended up with Ronald Reagan, who felt no obligation to negotiate, let alone yield anything.
The Bush administration has learned a painful lesson: Its preferred outcome of a stable, democratic, pro-American regime in Iraq will never be. This is largely because Iran easily can foment instability via its Shiite proxies indefinitely. But now Iran realizes that it cannot have its preferred outcome either: another Shiite client state and regional hegemony. As a result, Iran has agreed to earnest negotiations with its most ardent regional rival.
Lost in the fog of Iraqi bombings and reprisals was the recent killing of Mohammed al-Badri - a top al-Qaida figure in Iraq - in a U.S. air strike. Al-Badri orchestrated the bombing of the al-Asakariyah shrine, revered by Shiites. The killing was significant to Iran. According to Strategic Forecasting, "Though public distrust has marred past rounds of negotiations, this time might be different . . . .The Americans now are figuratively dropping a head on the table as a token of sincerity."
And Iran's sincerity? It is no coincidence that Iran has agreed to international inspections of its nuclear program.
But what of other troubling events in Iraq? For example, in advance of the latest round of U.S.- Iranian talks, several Sunni members of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's cabinet resigned, while numerous others temporarily boycotted. Suspicion abounds among Iraq's Sunnis that an agreement between Iran and the U.S. will favor Iraqi Shiites. Some Sunnis would rather disrupt the Iran-U.S. rapprochement now than face a Shiite-dominated government later.
Here is where Saudi Arabia enters the picture. As the chief Sunni state in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, too, fears an ascendant Iran. A reconstituted Iraq dominated by Iran would bring the Persian Shiite aggressor to the doorstep of the Sunni Arab homeland. Last week's attacks by Saudi police on Iraqi pilgrims (including relatives of a senior government official) at a holy site in Mecca were a reminder that the Saudis still have clout - not to mention control over Islam's holiest cities.
The Saudis and Iraq's Sunnis are perhaps justifiably fearful of an Iranian-American deal, which explains why the Bush administration picked this time to announce major arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf allies.
Why, the critics ask, would the administration throw fuel on a fire already out of control by introducing more weapons to a troubled region? The answer is simple: The weapons are meant to allay Saudi concerns about concessions to Iran. What's more, the approach seems to be working. Despite their fears, the Saudis thus far have been content to trust America to secure Sunni interests at the table with Iran.
If all of this seems complicated, that's because it is. Delicate, too. Like used tea leaves, these initial steps toward stability in Iraq could be overturned by a simple swish of the cup. Nevertheless, if one substitutes recent events for tea leaves, the future of Iraq is looking a little less gloomy.